Abstract-After 38 years of birthday Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (DHKE), there are many proposed improvements in the DHKE protocol to encounter modern security issues. This protocol seems quite simple to be implemented; but it can be vulnerable to many types of attacks. In this work, we propose the Chained Key Exchange scheme as a case study to explore cryptographic computation capability of embedded microcontroller. We choose ARM RaspberryPi board as hardware platform for experimental setup. To enable RasberberryPi "system on chip" (SoC) to perform cryptographic computation, we modified the GNU GMP Bignum library to support a simple primitive cryptographic computation in the UBOOT firmware. The main purpose of our study is to determine whether there is any gap between cryptographic protocol/scheme (in term of theoretical) and its engineering implementation. Our scheme will be integrated with Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) application in the UBOOT firmware. Our proposed scheme in the TFTP protocol will secure the sharing of secrets and symmetric keys (e.g., AES256). After that, the symmetric encryption algorithm can be used to encrypt data in the cases of remote system updates, patching and upgrades (e.g., firmware, kernel or application).
I. INTRODUCTION
he state of art for key exchange protocol is based on 1976 paper "New Directions in Cryptography" [1] , Diffie and Hellman Key Exchange (DHKE) present a secure key agreement protocol that can be carried out over unsecure public communication channels. This protocol seems quite simple to be implemented; but it can be Manuscript received March 20, 2014 ; revised April 10, 2014 . The authors would like to thank to Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE) for providing the grant 600-RMI/ERGS 5/3 (12/2013) vulnerable to many types of attacks that are based on Number Theory. In this work, we propose the Chained Key Exchange scheme as a case study to explore cryptographic computation capability of embedded microcontroller.
II. RELATED WORK
After 38 years of birthday DHKE, there are more than 50 proposed improvements in DHKE protocol to encounter security issues such as: J.F. Raymond (2002) [2] collective of attacks in the DHKE protocol and a good idea about how to securely implement the DH protocol in various systems. E. Brickell (2004) [3] provided the first Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) scheme based on the strong RSA assumption and decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. R.C.W Phan (2006) [4] performs cryptanalysis in the DHKE using N-party encrypted different passwords.
E.J. Yoon (2009) [5] proposed an efficient DH's MAC with forward secrecy, key independence and protection against session state reveal attacks. D. Fiore (2010) [6] proposed a new identity based key agreement protocol that is can be implemented over any cyclic group of prime order, where the Diffie-Hellman problem is supposed to be hard. P. Vyas (2012) [7] described various protocols used for key exchange such as freshness of message. H. K. Pathak (2013) [11] proposed two password based of simple three party key exchange protocols via twin Diffie-Hellman problem and showed the proposed protocols provide greater security and efficiency than the existing protocols.
III. MOTIVATION
Our main motivation in proposing the Chain Key Exchange scheme is to explore the computation capability of embedded microcontrollers such as ARM6 RaspberryPi board in performing cryptographic computation. To explore the possible constraints in the theoretical and experimental designs, we have decided to only use the RaspberryPi board and a USB debug/console cable as experimental setup for the experiment. The RaspberryPi board can support extra I/O functions (add-on card) including sensors, Wi-Fi, camera, sub controllers (e.g., random number generator and customized FPGA with cryptographic functions) and etc. However, we omitted these extra I/O features because we want to study a plain embedded board to perform cryptographic functions.
Chained Key Exchange scheme can be considered as a simple key exchange protocol with only minimal security properties such as forward secrecy and key independence An Experimental Study of Cryptography Capability using Chained Key Exchange Scheme for Embedded Devices for implementation in the experiment. The main purpose of our study is to determine whether there is any gap between cryptographic protocol/scheme (in term of theoretical) and its engineering implementation. Our intention is to make it as a full working generic security device from an existing microcontroller. From our past experience, we know that is not trivial to do implementation of a cryptographic device which is secured in theoretical, and also secure in its realized device.
A. Objective
The objective of this paper is to explore cryptographic computation capability of Chained Key Exchange scheme for an embedded microcontroller in a constrained environment.
B. Target Application
This study will attempt to establish a secure and trust based key exchange protocol in the embedded controller. The term of "trust" is based on our previous work in Trusted Computing wherein "How can we be assured device(s) and system(s) are trusted if we use trusted computing platform (e.g., TPM) as root of trust?" [8] . For this experiment, we do not use Trusted Platform Modules (TPM), but rather, we explore the concept of "chain of trust" in the cryptographic scheme, i.e. chain of trust of secret keys. The "chain of trust of secret keys" allows our protocol to verify that new communication with third parties is the same as previous communication through secure transitive sessions. The proposed protocol would be useful for lightweight or smart embedded device to identify whether an adversary is trying to intrude into the confidential communication. Energy usage becomes major factor for operational consideration by lightweight devices especially for deployment without compromising on security. In our proposal, we will use minimal I/O peripheral to reduce energy consumption, and at the same time yield high cryptographic computation in the autonomous environment.
In the long term run, our scheme will provide an implementation of Secure Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) application in the UBOOT firmware. It will ensure remote system updates and patching (e.g., firmware, kernel or application) processes are secure from attacks which aim to eavesdrop and modify the TFTP packet. The target employment of Secure TFTP protocol is in the Wi-Fi Access Points, remote base stations, wireless sensor nodes and etc.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
A. Chained Key Exchange Scheme A1. Initialization of pre-shared knowledge between two parties (assume that their names are Along and Busu). This pre-shared knowledge must happen during production, physical exchange or through a trusted communication. 
Busu share public information with Along.
Along computes:
≡ mod
Finally, both parties store the matching secret in the non-volatile memory with physical tamper resistant technology wherein the secret key is protected using user authentication. This initialization of crt key is less likely to be computed compared to the session key and chain key. We assumed computation happens only in safe environments (e.g., during production of embedded device) and no integrity verification of the messages is required. Furthermore, an adversary would not be able to eavesdrop this information because it happens in close environments. This initialization scheme has been originated from DHKE [1] scheme.
A2. Initialization of "chained of session key" between two parties.
In this scenario, the "chain of session key" occurs in open communication channel; hence it is still vulnerable to adversaries. Along generates: chain of session of random numbers. Along stores , , in the non-volatile memory equipped with physical tamper-resistant technology. Along's secret is protected using user session authentication. Then, Along computes:
Along share public information , , with Busu.
Busu generates: secret of random numbers, of length nbits.
∈ * and i 0, where 0 is initial chain sequence Busu stores , , in the non-volatile memory equipped with physical tamper-resistant. Busu's secret is protected using user session authentication. Then, Busu computes:
Along computes:
Session needs to be verified before being stored or used (explained in Section A3 for details). The shared secret requires 3n length of exponential computation or 3 as shown in (3) . For the next session of key computation, we use key derivative function to derive from . Therefore, we conclude that the as follow:
However, there is no guarantee that in (1-3) will be the size of n after the successful key exchange process. In worst case scenario, it produces a weak key with a short length. Therefore, needs to be checked 1 /discarded before we can proceed to the verification process as it will be explained next.
A3. Verification of "chained of session key"
The purpose of verification is to ensure that both parties will synchronize and Message Authentication Code (MAC) the generated from Section A2. If successful, both parties will store the matching secret in the nonvolatile memory equipped with physical tamper resistant technology wherein the secret key is protected using user authentication. The previous (if it still exists) is safely wiped out from nonvolatile memory. We define nonce as ∈ * and initial with 0′s string of length n.
Along performs hashing function:
Along shares public information with Busu.
Busu performs hashing function:
Busu expects :
Busu shares public information with Along.
Along verifies:
Busu verifies:
Observe that in hashing function between Along and Busu, the sequence of hashing function is different in the first parameter and the second parameter for the hashing input. This will guarantee that the hashing digests of Along and Busu are different for the MAC authentication process. To protect from an attack based on Number Theory, such as "degenerate message attack" [2] , we need to ensure random secrets, public parameters and are not recycled numbers. For the next session, we must use a secure one way key derivation function to derive from to avoid using previous key.
After that, both parties store that has been successfully verified. In case of failure, the digest need to be retransmitted (retry) because errors may happen in communication medium when using non-reliable network. Failure to do correction and verification within the allowed number of retries, the verification process is considered 1 We can use generated key with a key length less than n (e.g.
-2 length); but we need to use a secure one way key expander/derivation function to fill-up (or padding) the less significant part of number in -2 length. However this is very risky when the -length is too short.
invalid and the chain of session must be dropped. All temporary data in Section A2 must also be safely wiped out from volatile memory. If this problem happens, we can consider that there are problems i) in the communication channel, ii) an active adversary is impersonating either parties or iii) an active adversary has tampered the digest.
B. Embedded System
We decided to use RasberberryPi Model B (Fig. 1) with specifications: BCM2835 (ARMv6k) 700 MHz, 512MB RAM, 16GB SD memory card, 10/100 Ethernet port. This board is widely used for system prototyping or experiment, system controller, surveillance system, cluster nodes, embedded programming etc. We have done literature review on past works and we found that it is not well explored yet. From here, we decided to conduct cryptographic primitive computation using this board. Among the major issues need to be considered when using this board are GCC ARM compiler and GMP Bignum [9] library to compute numbers beyond 32-bit integers (e.g., exponential, modular, etc.).
We conducted an experiment based on "one-group pretest-posttest" [10] [11] experimental design to evaluate performance measurement of Chained Key Exchange scheme. The first test group was conducted in application layer (user space) through Linux Raspbian "wheezy" Kernel using precompiled image "2013-07-26-wheezyraspbian.zip" [12] . The second test group was conducted in firmware layer (bare metal) using Denx U-Boot [13] as platform for bare metal execution of our scheme. U-Boot provides cross platform execution because it supports multiple embedded architecture such as ARM, MIPS, PPC, x86, 68k, Nios and etc. Therefore, we are confident that with a very minimal configuration, our protocol can be deployed in multiple embedded systems.
To enable RasberberryPi "system on chip" (SoC) to perform cryptographic computation, we modified the GMP Bignum version gmp-5.1.0 [9] library for a simple primitive cryptographic library. However, major modification is required in a bare metal system because of missing C library and its dependencies in the U-Boot. We noted that most of standard C libraries are meant for application and kernel layers, but not in firmware layer. This means that most of C libraries in firmware programming are minimal for the purpose of startup for the device and loading an operating system kernel for a system to boot up. To reduce the complexity, we modified the "mini-gmp" section to diminish the dependency problems. The modified "minigmp" is encoded in the first and second group experiments for fairness of execution and timing measurements. Our new "mini-gmp" library support the major functions for cryptographic computations such as mpz_init(), mpz_clear(), mpz_t, mpz_set_str(), mpz_powm(), mpz_get_str(), mpz_cmp(), mpz_sub(), mpz_add(), mpz_ui_pow_ui(), mpz_gcdext(), mpz_invert() clock(), SHA512(), and etc. Based on our previous work, we work on the communication protocol for two sets of RasberberryPi board using a secure TFTP protocol for smart environment [14] . This work [14] we discussed the modification of U-Boot's TFTP protocol to support a secure key exchange and data encryption. 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS

A. Protocol Security
The underlying security principles for Chain Key Exchange scheme are based on the i) Decision DiffieHellman Problem (DDHP) [15] and ii) one way hash function [16] . To solve DDLP, an adversary needs to find , , , in Section A1. For example, is a primitive root of of order .
It is not feasible to use brute force to find in above equation. The fast algorithm to do brute force for modular exponential requires time complexity of 2 where is a number of steps in bits. We use hash function in Section A3 for verification of secret key that is generated during chain of key exchange. We consider a simple Message Authentication Code (MAC) hash function to verify Along's and Busu's shared secret key in the communication. We also assume that the one way hash function is a secure pseudo random generator [16] wherein the adversary cannot distinguish the hashing output (digest) from input to the hashing algorithm. For the moment, we use a standard SHA512 because it has been assumed to be secure 2 because current session secrets , are unknown. 2 We choose to use SHA-512 because it receives wider input block in size of 1024 bits and output hashing digest in size of 64 words or strings. With this size of input block, it can be pushed all at once for n = 1024 bits. It helps to produce a better MAC in terms of 64 words of hashing digest.
iii.
Key independence: Based on the forward secrecy, the scheme is secure when an adversary manages to know the previous secret key because of a new session secrets , , are generated and computed independently from all previous sessions. An adversary cannot attack a new chain of session using previous knowledge; even if those previous session keys are already broken and exposed. This requires the total length of all secrets ( , , 3 length of bits and each secret length of bits. At present, it is acceptable to use 2 where 1024 bits length. Based on DDHP assumption, an adversary knowledge of is considered infeasible to derive ≡ .
. because of unknown secrets , (total 2 of secrets length is considered infeasible to attack). Therefore, using new ephemeral random numbers , with appropriate length, our scheme is resistant against "DenningSacco" [22] [7] attack.
iv.
Key derivation function attack: Our scheme can resist the Burmester triangle attack [23] because we include 1) key derivate function to derive from and 2) the public parameters and only consist 2n length of exponential computations of 2 secrets (such as , ) in Section A2. Both public parameters could never be computed with or (due to the missing the 3 rd secret value in public parameters as). An adversary can impersonate Along when communicated with Busu in (4-6) and vice versa (7-9). Let us assume that an adversary can also manages to break previous session 1 with adversary's knowledge of the secrets , . However, the adversary will fail to break (11) of our protocol because of the two reasons mentioned above. With a strong key derivation function, we can secure future session keys because it destroys algebraic relationships 3 in between old session keys and new session keys.
(6) and (9) 
From ( 3 We considered that the key derivation function is a secure one way pseudo random function wherein both sides (Along and Busu) are using the same function to derive from . Key agreement and confirmation: Authentication based on hashing MAC is used to protect message integrity, replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack and chain of session keys in Section A3.
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B. Hardware Security
Physical access to RaspberryPi board is a major problem in the product deployment. An attacker can easily remove the SD card memory from the board and use memory card reader to access all data in the SD card. We can encrypt the memory region in SD card using common techniques such as disk encryption 4 . At the moment, there is no temper resistant circuit in the devices, it can be easily broken if an attacker has physical access to the device. We need extra I/O devices that are connected to board with implementation of physical temper resistant (e.g., memory), physically unclonable function (PUF), and etc.
C. Security Checkpoints for Implementation
We have listed below some security concerns and guidelines for the implementation and deployment. For additional reading, one may refer to [2] Table I shows the result of experiments wherein each experiment sessions are measured in seconds. All experimental setup are using the same codes and input data such as primes number, ephemeral secrets and etc. We use pre-generated random numbers and other input data to guarantee that is each experimental setup are free from bias 4 The size of UBOOT firmware with implementation of our scheme is 185,584 bytes. We can add user authentication module in the UBOOT firmware when user want to access our scheme (encrypted memory regions of secrets and keys). We considered it as a future work.
of randomness when using random number generator. The most fascinating and unexpected finding is that the performance of the protocol in bare metal is slower than execution in the operating system 5 . The results shown the computation time to exchange one secret key based on Sections A2, A3 and network performance. We omitted the Section A1 because of it can be generated using original DHKE or pre-install the device with core-root-key during manufacturing process. Based on result in the Table 1 , it is required 12~14 computation times to exchange a secret key in length of 2048 bits to compare with 1024 bits secret key. We conclude that is our experiment meets the minimal target objective in the research and development of Secure TFTP application in the UBOOT. It is extremely difficult and unrealistic to make a 360 degrees security fortification in order to fulfill all security requirements such as sidechannel security and [2] because of resource limitation in the embedded devices. [24] [25] to provide faster cryptographic computation to replace the DDHP because of it is slower in the exponential computation. We want to include a zero energy consumption of true random number generator using a wide band passive antenna and frequency hopping in receiver (Rx) antenna. This wide band receiver will consume analog signals or frequencies in the air space as input for powerless random number generator (or green RNG). For a current work, our research group is focusing in developing a secure TFTP communication in radio frequency (RF) using CISECO B023 Slice of Radio RF 5 Before we conduct the bare metal experiment, we used to believed that execution in the bare metal is faster because it is free from any disturbance of operating system [27] scheduling or context switching of processes (our hypothesis). Result of Table 1, prove that we need to consider the hardware implementation to make it works faster. In the bare metal environment; there is no pipelining and other OS's caching techniques that helps to improve the performance of data fetching and CPU's instruction fetching for CPU's execution process. transceiver [26] . For the cryptographic computing, we want to proof our hypothesis that executing in the bare metal is faster than executes in the generic operating system. This required additional programming in the UBOOT to improve CPU's caches and external caches, DMA and pipelining processes in the MMU.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We presented our Chain of Key Exchange scheme with experimental results. We succeed to fulfill our research objective and that is to explore cryptographic computation capability of embedded microcontroller in the constrained environment. Our major contribution is the integration of our scheme for secure TFTP application in the UBOOT firmware. However, the result in the experiments is not pretty as our hypothesis expectation. The result shown that is the performance of our scheme in the bare metal is slower compared to execution in the operating system. At the moment, we considered this is the most flopped research hypothesis for this research project. One might think that is our scheme and experiment are failure work. But, we will keep trying with new ideas and improve it even that are our 100 th flopped ideas and God rewards fool 6 .
